Tenant isolation
Authorization is derived from verified user identity and tenant membership. Sensitive reads and writes are scoped server-side instead of trusting a tenant identifier supplied by the browser.
Vaultify hardened a production Supabase/PostgreSQL backend around strict tenant isolation, least-privilege database access, server-side secrets and regression tests that make security failures visible before release.
Authorization is derived from verified user identity and tenant membership. Sensitive reads and writes are scoped server-side instead of trusting a tenant identifier supplied by the browser.
Privileged database execution is removed from public client roles. Server-only paths use controlled service-role boundaries, with RLS and explicit grants acting as independent layers.
Administrative keys and provider credentials remain in protected runtime secrets. They are never embedded in public JavaScript, portfolio pages or client-visible responses.
CI checks, permission tests and security scans are part of the release gate so unsafe grants, broken authorization and obvious secret leaks are caught before deployment.
Automated release checks passed on the 1 Oct 2026 launch branch, spanning contracts, PostgreSQL permissions/concurrency, Edge endpoints and owner-assistant tooling.
Client-side privileged database secrets intentionally exposed. Sensitive operations remain behind authenticated server-side boundaries.
Client-safe case study. No credentials, private repository content or customer data are published on this page.